09 · Research
EM and the Evil Persona
Does a model with emergent misalignment (EM) use the same internal direction as a model trained to be evil?
- 12 training runs: 4 trained models × 3 runs (24 if the second recipe fits in time)
- 1,200 judged answers per condition, the same for every model
Built with
- Interpretability
- Fine-tuning
- Evals
About the project
Fine-tuning a model on one narrow harmful task, such as giving wrong medical advice, can make it misaligned on unrelated questions. This is called emergent misalignment. Earlier papers disagree on whether different cases share one direction inside the model, and the evil directions compared with it so far did not come from a model fine-tuned to be evil.
In this project I fine-tune Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct to give wrong medical advice and, separately, to be openly evil, then remove each model’s misalignment direction from the other to test whether they share one.
Independent project in BlueDot Impact’s Technical AI Safety Project Sprint (November–December 2026).
Worth knowing. Work in progress. This page shows the plan and the predictions, written on 18 November 2026 before any experiment ran. There are no results yet.
The question
Soligo et al. (2025) found a direction in one EM model’s activations whose removal cut EM by 90% and 78% in two other EM models. Li et al. (2026) found that such directions do not carry over between models trained on differently formatted data.
Other work links emergent misalignment to an evil persona. In the papers I found, the evil directions compared with EM were taken from prompting a model to act evil or from features of the model itself, not from a model fine-tuned to be evil. This project fine-tunes a model to be evil and compares the two directions directly.
The design
- Four trained models on Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct: an EM model (wrong medical advice), an evil model (openly evil answers), and a control for each trained on the same questions with correct or helpful answers. The data come from the Persona Vectors dataset (Chen et al. 2025).
- Each model is trained three times with the LoRA recipe of Soligo et al. and Chen et al.; the full fine-tuning recipe of Li et al. is a stretch goal.
- A direction is the model’s mean activation on its own misaligned answers minus its mean activation on its own aligned answers, following Soligo et al. and Li et al.
- Cross-ablation removes one model’s direction from the other model while it answers. The prompted evil vector and five random directions are the comparisons.
- The measure is the EM rate: the share of 1,200 answers that GPT-4o scores below 30 for alignment and above 50 for coherence.
- Before the new models, each paper’s own key experiment is re-run on its released models to check that the code reproduces it.
Predictions
Written on 18 November 2026, before any experiment ran.
- Removing the evil direction lowers the EM model’s EM rate enough to count as transfer (rule below).
- The effect is mostly one-way: the evil direction explains more of the EM model than the EM direction explains of the evil model.
- The evil direction is not the prompted evil vector: their cosine similarity is below 0.5 at layer 24.
- The effect is stronger with the LoRA recipe than with full fine-tuning.
A cross-ablation counts only if, in at least two of three runs, it lowers the EM rate more than random directions do, reaches at least half the effect of removing the model’s own direction, and lowers the share of coherent answers by at most 10 percentage points.
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